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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TEN COMMANDMENTS:
COMPOUNDING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONFUSION
Jay A. Sekulow*
Francis J. Manion'
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decisions in Van Orden v. Perry' and McCreary County,
Kentucky v. ACLU ofKentucky2 have done nothing to clear away the fog obscuring
religious display cases or Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally. If
anything, the decisions have exacerbated an already confused and confusing area of
the Court's decisional law, an area which Justice Scalia has not shrunk from calling
"embarrassing. ' Douglas Laycock, who filed amicus briefs in both cases in support
of challengers of the respective displays, laments that the Court's decisions "draw
fuzzy and unprincipled lines."4 An editorial in Christianity Today captures the
understandable reactions of partisans of both sides:
Everyone knows the Supreme Court ruled that one kind of Ten
Commandments display on government property is unconstitu-
tional, but that another kind is acceptable. But no one -
including the Supreme Court itself - seems to be able to
explain why.5
It seems that the Chief Justice may have chosen the wrong classical allusion when,
in his Van Orden plurality opinion, he described the Court's Establishment Clause
cases as "Januslike," 6 i.e., pointing in two directions.7 A better choice would have
been "Hydralike," after the nine-headed mythological creature killed by Hercules as
* Chief Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice.
** Senior Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice.
125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
2 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
3 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Douglas Laycock, How to be Religiously Neutral, LEGAL TIMES, July 4, 2005, at 42.
Broken Tablets: The Court Splits the Baby and Denies the Rule of Law. Feel United
Yet?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 2005, at 26.
6 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2859; see also EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 51 (1942)
(describing Janus, the Roman god of good beginnings depicted with two faces looking in
opposite directions).
7 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2859.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
part of his famous Twelve Labors.8 After this pair of decisions, the question is
whether there is anywhere a logical, coherent principle or set of principles upon
which five or more members of the Court can agree in order to perform the
apparently Herculean task of adjudicating these cases in any kind of consistent,
predictable manner.
I. BACKGROUND
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the Van Orden and McCreary
decisions is that they utterly failed to resolve an issue that has been boiling over in
the lower courts for the past decade. Prior to 1996, only three reported decisions
addressed the merits of constitutional challenges to Ten Commandments displays
on non-school public property.9 After that, the deluge.' °
8 HAMILTON, supra note 6, at 231. Of the Hydra's nine heads, one was immortal. As for
the other eight, when Hercules chopped off one, two grew back in its place. Assisted by his
nephew Iolaus, Hercules used a burning brand to sear the neck as he chopped off each head
to prevent its growing back. He took care of the immortal one by burying it under a great
rock. Id.
9 Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that the
Eagles monument in front of courthouse was primarily secular and did not violate the
Establishment Clause); Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aft'd,
15 F.3d 1097 (11 th Cir. 1994) (holding that the framed panel of Ten Commandments and
Great Commandment in courthouse violated Establishment Clause; the order was stayed to
permit parties to create educational display incorporating panel); State v. Freedom from
Religion Found., 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995) (finding that the Eagles monument on State
Capitol grounds was secular and did not violate Establishment Clause).
0 Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005); ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc.
v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2990 (2005); ACLUNeb.
Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated and reh "g granted by
No. 02-2444, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6636 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004); ACLU of Ky. v.
McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Glassroth v.
Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003); Freethought
Soc'y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003); King v. Richmond
County, 331 F.3d 1271 (1lth Cir. 2003); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002);
Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002); Books v. City of Elkhart, 239
F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2001); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997); Turner v.
Habersham County, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Mercier v. City of La Crosse,
276 F. Supp. 2d 961 (W.D. Wis. 2003), rev'd and remanded sub nom., Mercier v. Fraternal
Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005); ACLU of Tenn. v. Rutherford County, 209
F. Supp. 2d 799 (M.D. Tenn. 2002); Baker v. Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., No. C-I-
99-94,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26226 (S.D. Ohio June 11, 2002), affid, 86 F. App'x 104 (6th
Cir. 2004); ACLU of Tenn. v. Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Tenn. 2002);
Kimbley v. Lawrence County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Ind. Civ. Liberties
Union v. O'Bannon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 842 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aft'd, 259 F.3d 766 (7th Cir.
2001).
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As this non-exhaustive list shows, from about 1997 on, hardly a month went by
without a decision being issued by either a district court or court of appeals on the
constitutionality of some Ten Commandments display somewhere in the nation.
The results were anything but consistent. The courts of appeals divided as follows:
The Tenth Circuit held onto a pre-Stone v. Graham" case upholding a courthouse
display of the Fraternal Order of Eagles monument. 2 The Third Circuit upheld a
courthouse plaque of the Decalogue dating from 1920."3 The Sixth Circuit struck
down every Ten Commandments display brought before it, including a Van Orden-
esque state Capitol Eagles monument,"' a judge's courtroom poster, 5 a school lawn
historical texts display,'6 and, of course, McCreary County's "Foundations of
American Law and Government" display.' 7 The Eleventh Circuit struck down Chief
Justice Roy Moore's monumental display, 8 but upheld Richmond County,
Georgia's use of the Decalogue in its seal.' 9 The Fifth Circuit upheld Texas's state
capitol display of the Eagles monument in Van Orden.2° The Seventh Circuit struck
down a state capitol monument display,2' struck down a city hall Eagles monument
display in the city of Elkhart, Indiana,22 but, just three months before the hammer
fell on McCreary County's display, upheld a courthouse display identical to
McCreary's in the county of Elkhart, Indiana.2 3 The Eighth Circuit took a wait-and-
see attitude. That court vacated a three judge panel's 2-1 decision affirming the
district court's striking down of an Eagles monument in a city park,24 heard oral
argument en banc on September 15, 2004, then apparently informally abated further
action pending the Supreme Court's consideration of Van Orden and McCreary.25
449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
12 Anderson, 475 F.2d 29. On August 1, 2005, a panel of the Tenth circuit, citing Van
Orden and McCreary, held that Anderson has been superseded by those cases.
'" Freethought Soc 'y, 334 F. 3d 247.
14 Adland, 307 F.3d 471.
'5 Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484.
16 Baker v. Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., No. C-1-99-94, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26226 (S.D. Ohio June 11, 2002), affd, 86 F. App'x 104 (6th Cir. 2004).
ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), affid, 125 S. Ct.
2722 (2005).
18 Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
'9 King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271 (1 lth Cir. 2003).
20 Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F. 3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), af'd, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
2 Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2001).
22 Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F. 3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000). For an exchange of views by
Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Scalia and Thomas) and Justice Stevens on the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari, see City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1058-63 (2001).
23 Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005).
24 ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), vacatedand
reh 'g granted by No. 02-2444, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6636 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004).
25 On August 19, 2005, the en banc Eight Circuit reversed the lower court's decision by
a vote of 10-2. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005).
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Confused? So were the lower courts, which frequently expressed, in the cases
cited above as well as in district court opinions, their frustration with the lack of
anything approaching clear direction from the highest court in the land. Judges at oral
argument repeatedly voiced this frustration and wondered aloud when the Supreme
Court was going to exercise its conflict-resolution responsibilities and give some guid-
ance to the inferior courts.26
But amidst the welter of confused and confusing lower court decisions, a certain
theme emerged: predictions by those courts of where the Supreme Court was likely
to go should it ever take up one of these cases. In hindsight, given the direction the
Court actually took in Van Orden and McCreary, those lower court forecasts bring
to mind the television weather forecaster who finds himself pelted with snowballs
after predicting a warm, dry day.
For example, the Third Circuit was convinced that the Supreme Court had
tacitly abandoned the Lemon test,27 at least in the context of religious displays and
symbols. Noting that, in cases such as Lynch v. Donnelly28 (at, least in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence), 29 County ofA llegheny v. A CL U,30 Capitol Square Review
& Advisory Board v. Pinnette,31 and Agostini v. Felton,n the Court had ignored
Lemon, the Third Circuit all but explicitly rejected the relevance of Lemon's purpose
prong and concentrated on the nuances of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test.33
In a similar way, the Fifth Circuit thought that Lemon's purpose and effect prongs
had been collapsed into the endorsement test.' The Seventh Circuit took a similar
approach in City of Elkhart,35 while, in the Elkhart county case,36 the panel majority
took the more traditional Lemon course while observing that "Lemon['s] days may
be numbered., 37 The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc in a religious motto case, poured
scorn on Lemon and applied a combination of Marsh v. Chambers" and the
endorsement test before grudgingly paying lip service to Lemon's prongs.39
26 Attorneys for the American Center for Law and Justice have, since 1997, argued some
sixteen times before a total of thirty-three district and courts of appeals judges in Ten
Commandments display cases. See generally American Center for Law and Justice,
http://www.aclj. org (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
27 Freethought Soc'y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003).
28 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
29 Id. at 687-94.
30 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
31 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
32 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
" Freethought Soc'y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247,257-62 (3d Cir.
2003).
14 Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 177-78 (5th Cir. 2003).
" Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 302 (7th Cir. 2000).
36 Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005).
31 Id. at 862.
38 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
" ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Sq. Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F. 3d 289, 305-08 (6th Cir.
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If anticipation of Lemon's demise was common among the inferior courts, it was
equally common among legal scholars. For instance, Berkeley's Jesse Choper, in
a 2002 article observing that Lemon "has been thoroughly discredited as a workable
Establishment Clause standard, '4° pronounced that "[t]he Court has implicitly
abandoned the Lemon test for the validity of enactments under the Establishment
Clause, and has instead adopted an approach championed by Justice O'Connor
the 'endorsement' test."41
Anticipation was heightened further when the Court granted certiorari in
McCreary on a set of questions presented that included the following: "Whether the
Lemon test should be overruled since the test is unworkable and has fostered
excessive confusion in Establishment Clause jurisprudence." '42
An additional tantalizing fact (and, in hindsight, well nigh inexplicable) was the
absence of Lemon in the Court's decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson.43 The Cutter case
was an Establishment Clause challenge to section 3 of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA)." The Sixth Circuit relied on
Lemon in holding that section 3 violated the Establishment Clause, but the Supreme
Court, per Justice Ginsburg, reversed in an opinion that expressly avoided Lemon.45
Lemon was relegated to a succinct footnote which acknowledged its existence but
stated: "We resolve this case on other grounds."46 Coming just three weeks before
the Court's Commandments decisions, Cutter seemed a harbinger of Lemon's
downfall.
II. McCREARY" YOU CAN'T KEEP A GOOD GHOUL DOwN
Justice Scalia's famous description of Lemon as a continually returning "ghoul
in a late-night horror movie" '47 never seemed more apt than in Lemon's stunning
2001) (en banc). In one of the seemingly endless ironies of this area of litigation, the en banc
Sixth Circuit thus cleared the way for Judge James DeWeese to sit in his courtroom beneath
Ohio's obviously religious and theologically exclusionary motto: "With God All Things Are
Possible," while a panel of the same Sixth Circuit struck down DeWeese's inclusion of a Ten
Commandments poster in a courtroom display intended to educate visitors about the
foundations of our legal system. ACLU of Ohio Found. v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484,491 (6th
Cir. 2004).
40 Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status andDesirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499
(2002) (footnotes omitted).
41 Id. (footnotes omitted).
42 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 310
(2004) (No. 03-1693), 2004 WL 1427470.
43 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
' Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc) (2000).
41 Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2120 n.6.
46 Id.
4' Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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reemergence as the principal analytical framework in Justice Souter's majority opinion
in McCreary.' Not merely was Lemon revived, it was given new blood. More so
than the inherent inconsistencies decried by critics of the Court's split decisions, the
revitalization of Lemon in this context - and the much maligned purpose prong at that
- may be the most surprising part of the Court's baby-splitting. After all, it would
not have been much of a surprise if, applying its prior "endorsement test" standards,
the Court had concluded that the Texas monument did not violate the Establishment
Clause while the Kentucky display did.49 The "endorsement test" itself, whatever its
superiority over the Lemon test, is still notoriously subjective. 50 But pinning the
decision on Lemon's purpose prong was an unexpected novelty.
In Justice Souter's hands, the purpose prong has been transformed. Where
previously this prong was quite easy to satisfy - a secular purpose was deemed
sufficient5' - the purpose prong now quite clearly requires apredominantly secular
purpose.52 This is a change in the law, Justice Souter's protestations to the contrary
notwithstanding.53 At the same time as it adds teeth to the purpose prong, this
development hastens the already apparent demise (at least in Establishment Clause
cases) of the Court's deference to a state's articulation of a secular purpose.54 A
judicial inquiry into which purposes are predominant must necessarily involve
sifting of evidence and assessing the credibility of state actors - the very antithesis
of "deference."
Nor does the McCreary majority offer any guidance on how multiple motives
or purposes are to be weighed in order to determine which one predominates. In the
typical case, one is dealing not with a single individual's purposes, but those of a
group of people - a governing body whose members may each have their own
different motives for voting to display the Decalogue varying from the purely
religious to the purely political. These individuals may or may not disclose their
"real" purposes; indeed, they may not have given very much thought to them.
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2732-33 (2005).
9 But see Broken Tablets, supra note 5. This editorial implied an opposite result from
the standpoint of a reasonable observer:
So guess which display won approval: Was it the six-foot granite monolith
inscribed with a Christian Chi-Rho symbol and "I AM the LORD thy GOD" in
extra-large letters? Or was it the framed copy of Exodus 20:3-17 from the King
James Version displayed along with the Magna Carta, the Declaration of
Independence, the Bill of Rights, and other items... ?
Id. In the view of the editorial writer, it was the Van Orden monument, not the McCreary
contextual display, which obviously smacked more of "endorsement" of religion. Id.
o See Choper, supra note 40, at 500 n. 10.
5' Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
52 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2736.
SId. at 2734-35. Even Justice Stevens had been content with the "a clearly secular
purpose" reading of Lemon. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
' See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2758 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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How is a court even supposed to discover all of the relevant evidence of a govern-
ment actor's purposes and motives, let alone somehow weigh them in some sort of
judicial Predominometer? The temptation to pick and choose tidbits of evidence
supporting one's own predilections is enormous.
The Court has yet to effectively counter Justice Scalia's devastating critique of
the purpose prong set out in his dissent in Edwards v. Aguillard:"
But the difficulty of knowing what vitiating purpose one is
looking for is as nothing compared with the difficulty of
knowing how or where to find it.... The number of possible
motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite.
... To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is
probably to look for something that does not exist.56
Now that the purpose prong is officially back, bigger and better than ever, Justice
Scalia's critique takes on fresh relevance.
That Justice Souter's use of the purpose prong in McCreary invites courts to
cherry pick the record in search of evidence propping up predetermined outcomes
(a criticism leveled by both Justices Scalia and Thomas)57 is evident from the
majority's own handling of the McCreary record. At the very outset of its recitation
of the facts in McCreary, the majority zoomed in on what was clearly inadmissible
hearsay contained in newspaper articles." What is worse, the majority highlighted
the inadmissible hearsay statements not of a county official - but the official's
pastor.5 The search for a predominantly religious purpose is apparently unbounded
by the basic rules of evidence or the even more basic notion that, if they are to count
at all, inadmissible hearsay statements ought to at least be attributable to the party
against whom they are sought to be used.
The mischief of the McCreary majority opinion is best summed up by Justice
Scalia:
By shifting the focus of Lemon's purpose prong from the search
for a genuine, secular motivation to the hunt for a predominantly
religious purpose, the Court converts what has in the past been
a fairly limited inquiry into a rigorous review of the full record.
5 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
56 Id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2757 (Scalia, I, dissenting) ("As bad as the Lemon test is, it
is worse for the fact that, since its inception, its seemingly simple mandates have been
manipulated to fit whatever result the Court aimed to achieve. Today's opinion is no
different."). Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion.
58 Id at 2728 (majority opinion).
59 Id.
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Those responsible for the adoption of the Religion Clauses
would surely regard it as a bitter irony that the religious values
they designed those Clauses to protect have now become so
distasteful to this Court that if they constitute anything more
than a subordinate motive for government action they will
invalidate it.'
It is actually worse than that. As Michael McConnell has incisively observed,
those people "responsible for the adoption of the Religion Clauses"' would undoubt-
edly find the current Supreme Court majority's understanding of the Establishment
Clause and, in particular, its use of Lemon's purpose and effect clauses, utterly
incomprehensible:
For example, the presence or absence of a "secular legislative
purpose" is said to be the first hallmark of an establishment. At
the end of the eighteenth century, however, advocates of
established religion almost invariably justified the establishment
on the basis of its social utility, not its religious truth or spiritual
value . . . .It was the opponents of the establishment, the
proponents of disestablishment, who were more likely to offer
religious or theological justifications for their position.62
Regarding the forbidden effect of "advancing religion," presumably still in place
as an analytical prong after McCreary, McConnell points out: "But one of the
principal arguments against establishment was that it was harmful to religion, and
many sought disestablishment in order to strengthen and revitalize Christianity. 63
It may fairly be said, therefore, that under current Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, as reaffirmed in McCreary, the Establishment Clause itself violates the
Establishment Clause.
And what of the "endorsement test"? It hardly figures at all in the McCreary
majority's analysis.' This is surprising in light of the Court's own prior forays into
this area in which, as noted above, the "endorsement test" had basically supplanted
Lemon as the proper analytical framework either explicitly, as in Allegheny and
Pinette, or implicitly in the opinions of the lower courts where, loath to ignore
Lemon entirely, judges would resort to "collapsing" or "folding" its prongs into the
60 Id. at 2758 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
61 Id.
62 Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part
I. Establishment ofReligion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105,2206 (2003) (footnote omitted).
63 Id.
' McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2737.
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"endorsement test." 5 In McCreary, even Justice O'Connor makes scant mention
of what is, by all accounts, one of the hallmarks of her Supreme Court career.66
Litigants on both sides of these cases are, in effect, back to square one in trying to
decide which test is the test and how they should most effectively structure their
arguments.
1H. VAN ORDEN V. PERRY. 67 SAL US CURIAE SUPREMA LEX68
Five minutes after Lemon's triumphant return from the grave in McCreary, the
Court proceeded to rebury it in Van Orden. The four justice plurality voted to
uphold the display of the six-foot-high monolith inscribed with the Ten Command-
ments, rejecting Lemon,69 and using something that reads like a hybrid Marsh v.
Chambers/endorsement test.70 The fifth and deciding vote was supplied by Justice
Breyer who, expressly disavowing reliance on Lemon,7 1 wrote that he relied "less
upon a literal application of any particular test than upon consideration of the basic
purposes of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses themselves."72 Justice Breyer
concluded that this was a "borderline case" and that, in such cases, there is "no test-
related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment., 73 He quickly added that this
65 See, e.g., Kirsten K. Wendela, Note, Context is in the Eye of the Beholder: Establishment
Clause Violations and the More-Than-Reasonable Person, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 981, 991
(2005) ("Because of the extensive criticism the Lemon test has received in recent years, the Third
Circuit held that the correct analysis in religious display cases comes from Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test. The court explained that this approach collapses the purpose and effects prongs
of Lemon into a single inquiry.") (footnote omitted) (citing Freethought Soc'y of Greater Phila.
v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2003)).
' See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2746 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
68 "The Safety (or Welfare) of the Court is the Highest Law." A paraphrase of the
Missouri state motto: "Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto": Let Welfare of the People be the
Supreme Law. The Great Seal of Missouri, http://www.sos.state.mo.us/symbols/symbols.
asp?symbol=seal (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
69 The Chief Justice wrote: "Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger
scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort
of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds." Van Orden, 125 S. Ct.
at 2861.
70 Id. at 2859-64.
71 Justice Breyer wrote that the Texas display "might satisfy this Court's more formal
Establishment Clause tests," citing both Lemon and Justice O'Connor's explication of the
endorsement test in Pinette. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
72 Id.
71 Id. at 2869.
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"legal judgment," by which Establishment Clause cases are to be decided from now
on, "is not a personal judgment."'74
But if it is not "a personal judgment," it is difficult to figure out exactly what else
it could be. Justice Thomas, concurring in Van Orden and quoting Justice Breyer's
"legal judgment" test, called it "the personal preferences ofjudges."75 Justice Scalia,
seeing a similar sort of untethered "legal judgment" behind the majority's rationale
in McCreary and other Establishment Clause cases, decried the practice of relying on
so amorphous a standard:
What distinguishes the rule of law from the dictatorship of a
shifting Supreme Court majority is the absolutely indispensable
requirement that judicial opinions be grounded in consistently
applied principle. That is what prevents judges from ruling now
this way, now that - thumbs up or thumbs down - as their
personal preferences dictate. Today's opinion forthrightly (or
actually, somewhat less than forthrightly) admits that it does not
rest upon consistently applied principle.76
Justice Breyer's "legal judgment" does take into account a number of factors.
The circumstances surrounding the monument's placement on the capitol grounds are
one such factor. 7 That the monument was donated by a civic (rather than religious)
organization that sought to highlight the organization's efforts to fight juvenile
delinquency, for Justice Breyer at least, suggests a secular motive.78 The physical
setting, a large park containing numerous other monuments and markers of a
historical nature, suggests that the intended context is one of "history and moral
ideals., 79 But the "determinative" factor is none of these things. The "determinative"
factor is that no one filed a formal legal objection to the monument's presence for
forty years until Mr. Van Orden filed his lawsuit.80
Justice Breyer does not even attempt to respond to what must be conceded are
formidable counter-arguments put forth by Justice Souter in dissent - formidable
especially in light of the Court's McCreary decision, a decision Justice Breyer
joined.8' Justice Souter points out that the inarguably religious nature of the text of
the Decalogue - the starting point of the McCreary analysis - is present also in
74 Id.
71 Id. at 2867 (Thomas, J., concurring).
76 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2751 (2005).
77 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2870.
78 id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2727.
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Van Orden. 2 If anything, the Eagles monument, with its graphic emphasis on the
words "I AM the LORD thy GOD" and its inclusion of indisputably Christian and
Jewish symbols,83 is far more obviously "religious" than the unadorned McCreary
County Decalogue situated amidst nine other similar looking texts.' As for the
physical setting, Justice Souter is having nothing to do with the idea that Texas's
agglomeration of miscellaneous markers has some discernible unifying theme, at
least a theme sufficient to neutralize the religious message of the Eagles' monument:
[A]nyone strolling around the lawn would surely take each
memorial on its own terms without any dawning sense that some
purpose held the miscellany together more coherently than
fortuity and the edge of the grass. One monument expresses
admiration for pioneer women. One pays respect to the fighters
of World War II. And one quotes the God of Abraham whose
command is the sanction for moral law .... [T]here is no
common denominator."
For Justice Souter, the setting of the monument on the Capitol grounds sends the
opposite message than the one Justice Breyer perceives:
There is something significant in the common term "statehouse"
to refer to a state capitol building: it is the civic home of every
one of the State's citizens.... [A]ny citizen should be able to
view that civic home without having to confront religious
expressions clearly meant to convey an official religious position
that may be at odds with his own religion, or with rejection of
religion. 6
Finally, Justice Souter is unimpressed with the "nobody's ever complained
before" factor, the "determinative" factor for Justice Breyer. Souter points out that
there may be many reasons - not least of which is "the risk of social ostracism" -
which come into play, to the extent that the forty-year gap is relevant at all."
82 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 2893.
" Justice Souter also points to evidence about the Eagles' original purpose in donating
these monuments. Id. at 2892 n. 1. Frankly, this evidence of purpose sounds at least as
religious as the evidence so decisive to the majority - including Justice Breyer - in
McCreary.
85 Id. at 2895.
86 Id. at 2897.
87 Id.
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The remarkable thing about Van Orden is that, given his concurrence in
McCreary, Justice Breyer did not similarly sign on to Justice Souter's opinion in
Van Orden."8 Had he done so, of course, the result would almost certainly have been
the removal of not only the Texas monument, but hundreds, and perhaps thousands,
of Ten Commandments monuments and similar symbols across the nation. 9 That the
mere failure of anyone to file a "legal objection" 9 to the monument should be the
"determinative" factor in what is the determinative opinion upholding this display
(and now, presumably, hundreds of others) is less than satisfying as a matter of
constitutional interpretation. In fact, it suggests that some other factor was truly
determinative here.
Justice Scalia's dissent in McCreary provides a clue to Breyer's defection from
the majority in that case to the monument-saving deciding vote in Van Orden.
Scalia bluntly answers his own rhetorical question about how to explain the
glaringly inconsistent decisions of the Court when it comes to upholding or striking
down religious or quasi-religious practices and traditions engaged in by government
officials:
I suggest it is the instinct for self-preservation, and the recog-
nition that the Court, which "has no influence over either the
sword or the purse," cannot go too far down the road of an
enforced neutrality that contradicts both historical fact and
current practice without losing all that sustains it: the willingness
of the people to accept its interpretation of the Constitution as
definitive, in preference to the contrary interpretation of the
democratically elected branches.9'
In other words, just as the "switch in time saved nine' 92 from FDR's Court-
packing plan in the 1930s, it is plausible to view Justice Breyer's switching sides
from McCreary to Van Orden as compelled by something other than the strict
88 Id. at 2892.
89 Justice Breyer recognized this, saying, "Such a holding might well encourage disputes
concerning the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public
buildings across the Nation." Id. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring).
90 Id. at 2870. Although not defined in the opinion, Justice Breyer's use of the phrase
"legal objection" implies that objections of an informal sort, however numerous or frequent,
would not suffice to tip the scales of his "legal judgment." Id. at 2869. This hardly seems
consistent with the desire he later expresses of avoiding divisive disputes about such
displays. If anything, it may well encourage objectors to formalize their objections via
litigation instead of attempting to resolve such disputes short of the formal legal process.
9' McCreary County v. ACLU ofKy., 125 S. Ct. 2722,2752 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
92 JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, 168 DAYS 135 (Doubleday 1938).
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application of clear and consistent constitutional principles. After all, as Justice
Breyer himself recognized in Van Orden, an opinion striking down the Texas
monument would have had enormous repercussions.93 Those repercussions, how-
ever, would not have been limited to the thousands of monuments and longstanding
depictions that would have been placed in imminent danger of removal. The
repercussions would also have been felt by a Court that increasingly finds itself
enmeshed, willingly or not, in the most contentious and divisive social and political
controversies of the day. Opinion polls regularly show overwhelming popular
support for Ten Commandments displays (and similar practices) with little apparent
distinction made by the public at large between McCreary-type and Van Orden-type
displays.94 A grand slam for the anti-display side, i.e., a pair of decisions effectively
banning Ten Commandments displays on all public property, would have provoked,
at a minimum, a firestorm of popular resentment directed at the Court and would
have fueled the always-simmering debate about whether or how to rein in an out-
of-control judicial branch. As noted earlier, however, the Court's split decision
avoided this outcome with reactions on both sides of the debate able to be
characterized more as bewilderment and confusion than triumph or outrage.95
IV. APPLYING MCCREARY AND VAN ORDEN
What both sides had hoped for in these cases - clear direction from the
Nation's highest court - is simply not to be found in the McCreary and Van Orden
decisions. As Professor Laycock put it: "The split decision, the emphasis on
government purpose in McCreary and Breyer's emphasis on the specific facts of
Van Orden, mean that we will be litigating these cases one at a time for a very long
time.' '96 And those who will be litigating these cases97 "one at a time for a very long
time"98 now face a quandary which is none too easily resolved - which test to
apply to any particular case, and how to apply it?
Before these decisions were made, it was possible to construct a logical legal
argument based on a reading of the Court's precedents coupled with an intelligent
(not so intelligent as it turned out) prediction of where the Court was heading. This
is what the courts of appeals did in Chester County, and in the Fifth Circuit's Van
9' Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring).
9' See, e.g., Survey Shows Broad Public Support for the Ten Commandments Display,
Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/tenconmand
ments.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
9' See Laycock, supra note 4.
96 id.
17 The American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) currently has eight Ten Command-
ments display cases in active litigation. Two ACLJ cases were denied certiorari on the day
after the McCreary and Van Orden decisions. Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd. v. Baker,
125 S. Ct. 2989 (2005); DeWeese v. ACLU of Ohio Found., 125 S. Ct. 2290 (2005).
98 See Laycock, supra note 4.
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Orden decision, viz., acknowledge Lemon as the not yet overruled benchmark and then
proceed to apply Justice O'Connor's endorsement test." But all that would seem to
be changed now. In both Chester County and Van Orden, for example, the courts
could have reached the same results without bothering to satisfy either Lemon or the
endorsement test; they simply could have noted the longstanding status of the
monuments, along with the fact that no formal objection had been filed for decades,
and then have been done with it.
If, however, City ofElkhart'" were brought today instead of five years ago, which
test would the court apply? That case involved an Eagles monument set amidst other
historical monuments and about which no one had complained for forty years."°' The
panel majority struck it down based on the Decalogue's inherent religiosity and the
statements of religious purpose made at its dedication in 1958. '02 Those statements,
however, were not substantially different from the religious-sounding statements
(noted by Justice Souter in Van Orden) that accompanied the Eagles' monument
donations generally. 0 3 The Van Orden plurality-plus-Justice Breyer thought such
statements were insignificant in light of other factors such as history, tradition, and
lack of community objection." Arguably, then, City of Elkhart would be decided
under the Court's Van Orden "test" now, and Elkhart's monument would still be
standing.
The McCreary and Van Orden decisions give no guidance about which test
applies when. Nor do they shed any light on how to apply whichever test is chosen.
For example, using McCreary's revitalized Lemon test, when should religious-
sounding statements be considered? Whose statements matter? One would think it
should only be statements of government actors. After all, it is only the government
that can violate the Establishment Clause. But the McCreary majority gave promi-
nence to statements made by a government official's pastor. Such an approach is
obviously fraught with danger and ripe for abuse. Who is within the zone of persons
whose statements of purpose may be counted against the government? Must
9' See VanOrdenv. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 177-78 (5th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2854
(2005); Freethought Soc'y ofGreater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247,250-51 (3d Cir.
2003).
"0 Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000).
10I Id. at 294.
102 Id. at 302-03.
'03 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2892 n.1 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
"o Id. at 2857 (plurality opinion) ("Th[e] 40 years [in which the monument went
unchallenged] suggest more strongly than can any set of formulaic tests that few individuals,
whatever their belief systems, are likely to have understood the monument as amounting, in
any significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to establish religion."); id. at 2863
("These displays and recognitions of the Ten Commandments bespeak the rich American
tradition of religious acknowledgments."); id. ("[T]he Ten Commandments have an
undeniable historical meaning."); see also id. at 2869-71 (Breyer, J., concurring in
judgment).
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government actors, politicians for the most part and acutely sensitive to popular
sentiment, act affirmatively to muzzle or contradict legally problematic statements
made by community members who support otherwise constitutionally defensible
displays?
And what of the issue of "taint"? Can government actors, such as the McCreary
officials, who start out with an unconstitutional display, ever correct their mistake?
After McCreary, it is clear that past sins count enormously, perhaps predominantly,
against the validity of subsequent attempts to display the Decalogue in any fashion.
But is there no statute of limitations for statements of invalid religious purpose? Are
places like McCreary and Pulaski Counties in Kentucky - as the Acting Solicitor
General suggested facetiously at oral argument in McCreary - now the equivalent
of Section 5-covered jurisdictions under the Voting Rights Act? 105 Nothing in either
the McCreary or Van Orden decisions even attempts to resolve these and a host of
other difficulties.
Of course, one way of avoiding the thorny problems created by McCreary's
revival of Lemon's purpose prong and the Lemon test generally would be simply to
conclude that a particular case is, factually, more like Van Orden than McCreary."°
This would permit the lower courts to avoid the tough issues of purpose, motive,
taint, and the other judicial nightmares for which Lemon has so long been castigated
and which led so many to look forward to its official downfall. Not all cases, how-
ever, lend themselves easily to the Van Orden approach and it is likely that it will
be these cases, involving more recent displays with a fresher "paper trail" littered
with statements of purpose, that will be analyzed under McCreary's decidedly non-
deferential standards.
The reality is that the approach most courts will take in these cases will, with the
Supreme Court's apparent blessing, be dictated more by an individual judge's "legal
judgment" (or, as Justice Thomas puts it, "personal preferences"'0 7) than by any
predictable application of clear legal principles. Until a consensus on the Court
itself coalesces around either approach or, perhaps a different approach entirely,
cases involving displays of the Decalogue or other religious symbols on government
property will continue to be resolved on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis.
105 Perhaps jurisdictions like McCreary County and Pulaski County, Kentucky-perhaps
the whole state, given the number of Ten Commandments cases arising there - could be
required to hold offon all courthouse renovations or redecorating pending review by the U.S.
Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §
1973.
106 Since the Court's McCreary and Van Orden decisions, four courts have rendered
decisions upholding the Commandments displays, relying largely on Van Orden. See ACLU
Neb. Found. v. Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005); Twombly v. City of Fargo, 388
F. Supp. 2d 983 (D.N.D. 2005); Card v. City of Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (W.D. Wash.
2005); Russelburg v. Gibson County, No. 3:03-CV-00149-RLY-WGH, 2005 WL 2175527
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 7, 2005).
107 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2867 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
CONCLUSION
Is there a way out? The dissents of Justices Scalia and Thomas suggest at least
two such ways. A third, less direct approach, suggested in the past by Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, but for reasons unknown not touched upon in
McCreary or Van Orden, is also worth considering.
Justice Scalia, dissenting in McCreary, went to the root of the problem: Everson's
"demonstrably false principle that the government cannot favor religion over
irreligion."'08 Justice Scalia distinguished between application of this principle to
public aid or free exercise cases (where the principle is valid) and cases involving
"public acknowledgement of the Creator" (where it is not). Clarification ofEverson 's
generalization - the fountainhead of much Establishment Clause mischief- would
go far toward lessening the confusion.
Justice Thomas would go even further. Reiterating, though not insisting upon,
his radical (yet logically and historically irrefutable) observation that the Establish-
ment Clause does not restrain the States, an observation first made in Zelman' ° and
repeated in Newdow," Thomas would return to the "original meaning" of the word
"establishment" as necessarily including an element of coercion."' Mere offense,
disagreement, or even genuinely felt insult would simply not give rise to an
Establishment Clause violation. 12 After cataloguing the familiar examples of the
Court's inconsistencies caused by its futile attempts to improve upon the Framers'
original understanding of "establishment," Thomas concluded:
Much, if not all, of this would be avoided if the Court would return
to the views of the Framers and adopt coercion as the touchstone
for our Establishment Clause inquiry. Every acknowledgment of
religion would not give rise to an Establishment Clause claim.
Courts would not act as theological commissions, judging the
meaning of religious matters. Most important, our precedent
would be capable of consistent and coherent application. 113
A third approach - tightening the requirements for Article III standing - is
worth considering. It has the advantage of indirection, i.e., it would not require a
radical overruling of the Court's Establishment Clause precedents, but it would
weed out many, if not most, of the seemingly endless parade of challenges to what
are, for the most part, traditional, non-controversial practices that enjoy the broad
support of the American people.
108 McCreary Countyv. ACLU ofKy., 125 S. Ct. 2722,2752 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Zelian v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
"o Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 125 S. Ct. 21 (2004).
.. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 2867-68.
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For reasons unexplained, none of the justices discussed standing in the McCreary
and Van Orden cases. Yet in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor
Separation of Church and State, 14 an Establishment Clause case, the Court held that
the "psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with
which one disagrees" is not an "injury" sufficient to give standing under Article M." 5
The Court has never overruled this statement of basic principle, even if the lower
courts, in religious display cases, have avoided it like the plague. Three members of
the Court, dissenting from a denial of certiorari, applied the Valley Forge principle
to a city's display of a Latin cross on its seal, signs, flags, stationery, and official
documents." 6 There is no meaningful distinction between the factual predicates for
standing advanced by the McCreary and Van Orden plaintiffs (not to mention the
plaintiffs in dozens of lower court display cases) and the plaintiffs in Valley Forge and
City of Edmond.
The logic of the "no standing" approach is tied in closely to the coercion
requirement and, thus, would permit the Court to move toward a coercion test in
displays and symbols cases without abandoning the flexibility the majority thinks
it needs in deciding other kinds of Establishment Clause cases. As articulated by
Judge Easterbrook in Elkhart County, this approach also makes sense of and helps
reconcile cases and situations where courts, and the Nation in general, find tolerable
messages that other citizens may find deeply offensive without conferring on those
so offended a legal entitlement to have such messages silenced:
What the display may do is give offense, either to persons
outside the religious tradition that includes the Book of Exodus
or to those who believe that religion and government should be
hermetically separated. Yet Themis [Greek goddess and model
for Lady Justice] may offend Christians (and all icons offend
Muslims), the military's ads offend religious pacifists, and the
message in Rust supports one religious perspective on human
life while deprecating others. Public policies and arguments pro
and con about them often give offense, as do curricular choices
in public schools. But the rebuke implied when a governmental
body supports a point of view that any given person finds
contemptible (or believes should be left to the private sector) is
a great distance from "coercion." So great a distance, indeed,
that the insulted person lacks standing to sue." 7
114 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
"' Id. at 485.
116 City of Edmund v. Robinson, 517 U.S. 1201, 1202-03 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
"' Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857,870 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
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One thing has been made clear by the McCreary and Van Orden decisions: just
as before, not much is predictable in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Of
course, with the retirement of Justice O'Connor and the death of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the temptation to engage in "what-if' speculation is irresistible. The
replacement of Rehnquist by John Roberts" 8 - by all indications a judge with a
constitutional philosophy similar to that of his mentor, the late Chief Justice -
coupled with the replacement of Justice O'Connor by the Third Circuit's Judge
Samuel A. Alito" 9 - portends a realignment on these cases that will probably lead
the Court at least in the direction of the Van Orden plurality and away from Justice
Breyer's amorphous "legal judgment" approach. Whatever direction the Roberts
Court might take, any of the alternative approaches suggested here would be an
improvement over the post-McCreary and Van Orden morass in which we now find
ourselves.
,tS It would appear that John Roberts clerked for then-Justice Rehnquist during the same
term, 1980-81, in which Justice Rehnquist wrote his forceful dissent in the Court's only prior
Ten Commandments case, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
"9 Judge Alito's nomination as O'Connor's successor is particularly interesting. InACLU
of New Jersey v. Schundler, 108 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999), Alito wrote for the majority in
reversing the district court's injunction against a city's modified Christmas display that
included a menorah, a creche, a Christmas tree, and other holiday decorations. Alito
expressly rejected the notion of "unconstitutional taint," the very notion that underlies the
majority's holding in McCreary. It seems likely that a Justice Alito would have tipped the
scales in favor of the Kentucky counties in McCreary.
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